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The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between the development policy of the
Sarawak government and the indigenous people in rural areas, by observing the mobility of rural-
urban migrants. Over the last decade or so, the Sarawak government has been promoting vari-
ous kinds of development schemes in rural areas, and the indigenous people, who are politically
and economically marginalized, seem to act in compliance with the government policy for the
purpose of securing development funds. Some scholars have criticized this kind of passive com-
pliance as a “subsidy syndrome.” However, closer observation of the voting behavior of the
indigenous people reveals that they strive to maximize their own interests, albeit within a limited
range of choices. What is noteworthy is the important role played by rural-urban migrants in
rural development. They frequently move back and forth between urban and rural areas, are
leaders in the formation of opinion among rural residents, and help obtain development resources
for their home villages. Examining the mobility of urban migrants during election periods is
useful for reconsidering the dichotomy between development politics and the vulnerable agricul-
tural community, and also urban-rural relations.
Keywords: Iban, Sarawak, voting activity, rural-urban migration, development policy, rural devel-
opment
I Introduction
Based on my previous studies of rural-urban population mobility of the Iban, an indigenous
people in Sarawak [Soda 1999a; 2000], it is apparent that rural-urban relations — more
specifically, the mobility of indigenous peoples between rural and urban areas — is significantly
affected by development-biased political system.
There has been much discussion over the reactions and responses of particular ethnic and
minority groups to political decisions. A classic example is the rainbow theory of machine
politics and its refutations, which attempted to show how ethnic minorities achieved varying
degrees of influence and recognition in city politics in the United States [i.e. Erie 1988; Inglot
and Pelissero 1993]. But when discussing the relationship between the nation state and
ethnicity in the context of Southeast Asia, there are a number of questions that must be




addressed such as the arbitrary drawing and control of ethnic boundaries by the government
(in many cases, a hold-over from the colonial period), and the extreme vulnerability of
indigenous minorities to the power of the political majority. Moreover, the emphasis on
development policy in the post-colonial period and the recent trends of rural-urban migration of
indigenous peoples have made the relationship between the developmental state and ethnicity
more complicated.
Since the 1980s, empirical studies on the interaction between the nation state and ethnicity
have critically examined the historical process in which ethnic categories have been created and
settled by the colonial and post-colonial governments. These studies revealed the vagueness of
such ethnic categories. The findings of these investigations have deepened our understanding
of “ethnicity” and its relationship to nation states.1)
Going beyond the concept of “ethnicity” itself, recent studies have dealt with the
“vulnerability” of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples. “Vulnerability theory” often
discusses the conflicts between nation states and indigenous peoples over the distribution of
resources, and criticizes the marginalization or exclusion of vulnerable peoples. Some scholars
such as Hong [1987] and Inoue [2002] see themselves as benevolent advocates of peoples who
are politically tyrannized in the name of development policy.2)
We can see these two trends of study as closely related research fields, if we consider the
features of locality and regionality imposed on particular ethnic groups. In post-colonial
Southeast Asia, an image has been created, whether appropriate or not, of the juxtaposition
between the ethnic (or political) majority who live in the plains or urban areas and the ethnic
minorities who subsist in the interior or on the periphery.3) After gaining independence,
Southeast Asian countries have attached much importance to economic and industrial
development, especially in urban areas, by largely relying on foreign trade and investment from
developed countries [Armstrong and McGee 1985]. Rural development policy, on the other
hand, has been driven by two basic objectives. One is finding ways to fully utilize rural
resources and land, which are often considered by the urban dweller and the political majority
to lie “idle.” The other objective is to find ways to prevent rural (indigenous) peasants from
migrating into the cities and to somehow encourage them to remain on the “periphery,” goals
that are reflected in the temporary expedient of promoting rural agriculture.4)
In the case of Sarawak, the Malay/Melanau (Muslim Bumiputera), who mainly live in the
1) Useful examples in Asia are provided by the following studies: Nagata [1981], Harrell [1994], Segawa
[1995], Winzeler [1997], King and Wilder [1982]. For case studies on Sarawak, see Pringle [1970],
King [1982], Uchibori [1987], and Ishikawa [1997].
2) See also Lumb [1993], and articles in Law and Society Review 28(3) [1994]. Recently, there have
been lively discussions in the field of “political ecology.” Details regarding the emergence of political
ecology and its subsequent development can be found in Shimada [1998].
3) For example, see Ayabe [1994] and Russel [1989].
4) There is also the policy of population adjustment, such as encouraging migration from overpopulated
areas to agricultural frontiers, e.g., the construction of FELDA in Malaysia, the transmigration
program in Indonesia, and SALCRA in Sarawak. For example, see Bahrin [1988], Jawan [1994], and
Elmhirst [1999].
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coastal plains, are considered a political beneficiary group in the context of Muslim-preferred
policy, and the Chinese are widely considered to enjoy a monopoly on the urban economy. On
the other hand, the “Dayak” have often been regarded as indigenous groups who live in the
interior and subsist on traditional shifting cultivation [King and Jawan 1996]. At the same time,
there seems to be a conscious effort by politicians — not only Malay and Chinese politicians but
Dayak politicians as well — to frame the problem of regional disparities between urban and
rural, or the advanced plains and the underdeveloped interior, as an issue of the relationship
between the majority and the minorities. Although it is obvious that these two dichotomies
cannot be considered strictly the same, politicians have often tried to identify regional
disparities with ethnic differences — as the Dayak-based party did in the 1980s and 90s — in
order to promote rural development. It is also expedient to attribute ethnic problems to
regional disparities and a favorite device of the developmental state to secure a national
consensus over the need for “balanced development.” In such situations, how do indigenous
peoples (who are often regarded as “vulnerable peasants”) perceive themselves in the context of
the nation state and how do they take part in the politics of development? In order to
reconsider the above dichotomies, this paper analyzes the voting activities of rural-urban
migrants in relation to the politics of development in Sarawak. Elections are a highly visible
political stage-show, where rural proprietors can more easily interact with the nation state over
the allocation of resources, and rural-urban migrants also appear on the scene as very important
actors. As will be shown later, rural-urban migrants, who frequently go back and forth
between urban and rural areas, are influential in resource management in their home
Fig. 1 Map Showing Administrative Districts in Sarawak
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communities, and their mobility often reaches a peak during election periods in order to
maximize their impact. By considering this mobility as a catalyst for involving rural
populations in the politics of development, we may provide an alternate approach to the usual
discussion of the interaction between the nation state and “vulnerable peasants.”
In the following section, I will first explain the establishment of the Dayak-based political
party, the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak or PBDS, and its advocacy of rural development. The
third section will examine how the Iban in urban areas participate in rural development,
especially from the viewpoint of voting activities. The fourth section will describe an election
campaign where one of the main issues involved the establishment of a large-scale commercial
plantation. This example clarifies the perspective of the Iban toward resource management in
rural areas. Finally, we will examine the significance of the Iban migration strategy in so far as
it relates to rural development.
This paper is based on field research carried out intermittently among Iban villages in the
Kanowit district (in the middle basin of the Rajang River) and in an Iban community in the town
of Sibu (Fig. 1), the regional center of the Rajang area between 1996 and 2000. The Iban of
Sarawak in rural areas usually live in communal “longhouses,” in which participatory
observation was carried out. As for the Iban community in Sibu, research was conducted in a
residential area where former squatters were moved as part of a resettlement scheme by the
Sarawak government.
II Mechanism of Development Policy in “Underdeveloped” Areas
1. Complexity of Ethnic Categories in Sarawak
Since the 1980s, family migration from rural to urban areas has increased among members of
Iban society. While the portion of urban dwellers in the total Iban population was only 4.8
percent in 1980, it had grown to 18 percent in 1991 (Table 1), and is expected to increase
further in the years ahead. This paper examines the relationship between the “living strategy”
of the indigenous people and the government’s development policy, by taking issues of ethnicity
in Malaysia into account.
Table 1 Population Rate in Urban and Rural Areas by Ethnic Group (%)
Ethnic Group
1947 1960 1970 1980 1991
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Iban 0.6 99.4 0.9 99.1 2.3 97.7 4.8 95.2 17.9 82.1
Chinese 24.0 76.0 29.4 70.6 34.7 65.3 38.4 61.6 67.0 33.0
Malay 20.2 79.8 14.3 85.7 17.6 82.4 17.8 82.2 43.0 57.0
Bidayuh 0.6 99.4 1.4 98.6 2.5 97.5 4.9 95.1 19.0 81.0
Melanau 2.4 97.6 4.3 95.7 6.7 93.3 14.0 86.0 28.5 71.5
Other indigenous 0.3 99.7 0.6 99.4 2.6 97.4 5.3 94.7 13.9 86.1
Total 10.8 89.2 12.6 87.4 15.5 84.5 18.0 82.0 37.5 62.5
Source: [Masing 1988; Malaysia 1995]
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The category of population classified as “Iban,” apart from the question of its origin,
invokes a rather clear ethnic boundary at present, and their identity as Iban also tends to be
attributed to relatively simple criteria.5) Rather, what matters more for the Iban themselves are
the concepts of Dayak and Bumiputera, terms bestowed by politicians and the nation state on
collective ethnic groups.6) These obscure terms are often colored by politics and tend to create
confusion.
Another point is the gap between the preconceived attitudes of the Dayak and their actual
situation. Although the growing number of Dayak people who reside in cities is clear proof
that Dayak cannot be equated with “rural” or “interior” people, the Sarawak government
nevertheless tends to substitute “rural populace” and “interior community” for the Dayak
community. This substitution is done to justify the country’s development policy by replacing
the interests of specific ethnic groups with a national interest in reducing regional disparities.
Before we proceed, it is necessary to clarify the complexity of ethnic categories in
Sarawak. According to Jawan [1994] and Jawan and King [1997], the term Dayak, in the strict
sense, comprises the Sea Dayaks (Ibans) and Land Dayaks (Bidayuhs), but since the late 1980s,
it has become increasingly common to refer to the Ibans, Bidayuhs, and Orang Ulu (various
smaller non-Muslim indigenous groups) as Dayaks. Although these groups share certain
similarities in their physical outlook, longhouse living, languages, and customs [Kedit 1989],
Dayak as a collective term does not represent a single undifferentiated ethnic entity.7) Rather,
the term is only meaningful when political propaganda is needed, say in advocating develop-
ment projects for rural areas or in advocating the unity of non-Muslim indigenous peoples.
In the national context of Malaysia, the general term Bumiputera is well known. This is a
political term that was created to lump all indigenous peoples into one group. However, in
terms of the beneficiaries of the New Economic Policy,8) priority is clearly given to the Muslim
Bumiputera, while the Dayak, mostly non-Muslim Bumiputera, are relegated to a “second class”
Bumiputera status [Chin 1996]. Thus, in the context of Sarawak politics, we have to consider
5) On the other hand, it is also relatively easy to “become an Iban,” and even among those who are
categorized as Iban, there exist various ethnic identities such as Memaloh and Bekatan. See
Uchibori [1994] and Okuno [2000].
6) These terms are often used with political overtones. The category of Bumiputera was instrumental in
defining the privileged status of indigenous peoples apart from Chinese and Indian, while Dayak, as
mentioned later, was raised to inspire unity among non-Muslim indigenous peoples.
7) For the different attitudes of each ethnic group toward the acceptance of the label “Dayak,” refer to
Mason [1995].
8) The New Economic Policy was introduced in 1970 with a two-pronged objective. The first was to
eradicate poverty, and the second to restructure Malaysian society so that the Bumiputera would have
a more equitable share in the Malaysian economy. In this policy, various kinds of preferential
treatment were given to the Bumiputera. The New Economic Policy was superseded by the National
Development Policy in effect from 1991 until 2000. Although this policy did not define numerical
targets as did the New Economic Policy (e.g., New Economic Policy specified the target of raising the
capital holding rate of the Bumiputera up to 30 percent), the basic line of the Bumiputera-preferred
policy was continued. Therefore, so long as the “Bumiputera Policy” is understood as general
measures adopted to raise the Bumiputera’s economic status, the government policy since 1991 can
also be characterized as a type of Bumiputera Policy.
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the three categories that make up the total population (1,635,731): Muslim Bumiputera (27.4%),
non-Muslim Bumiputera (43.2%), and non-Bumiputera (29.2%).
Based on these categories, the Iban are the largest group among both the Dayak and the
non-Muslim Bumiputera. Particularly in the middle and lower Rajang, where the Iban are the
predominant indigenous people, Iban, Dayak, and non-Muslim Bumiputera are sometimes
regarded as synonymous.9)
2. Dayakism and Ruralism
In examining the relationship between ethnic categories and Sarawak development policy, it is
common knowledge that the government’s development projects are only provided to
supporters of the parties in power [Mason 1995; Aeria 1997]. This is most apparent in small-
scale projects in “underdeveloped” rural areas.
Politicians in Sarawak refer to this rural-biased development policy as “ruralism.” This
“ruralism” policy is related to the political term “Dayakism,” which was advocated by a Dayak-
based party, the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), as the party’s doctrine.
The PBDS was formed in 1983 when it split from the Sarawak National Party (SNAP).
The SNAP had been part of a coalition government (Sarawak Barisan) and represented the
interests of the Dayak community. However, in 1980, a dispute arose over who would succeed
President Datuk Dunstan Endawie when he resigned.  The most likely candidate was the then
Deputy President, Datuk James Wong (a Chinese), but a faction of young highly educated Iban
members protested that SNAP, as a Dayak-based party, should nominate a Dayak as
President. However, the senior Iban members, whose educational level was relatively low,
supported the Chinese candidate because they did not want to see their influence in the party
challenged by the young educated generation.10) This incidence was seen as a confrontation
between “multi-racialism” promoters and Dayak sympathizers on the one hand, and as friction
between different generations on the other. In short, it was a combination of political and
ethnic strife within the party that led to a confrontation among the Dayak (mostly Iban)
members. As a result, the young Iban members were defeated by the faction favoring the
Chinese candidate at the party’s general meeting in 1981, so the younger members broke away
from SNAP to organize a new Dayak-based party, the PBDS, in 1983.
The principles of the newly established PBDS may be summarized as follows:
SNAP no longer plays its original role of helping to alleviate rural poverty in the Dayak
community, even though the socio-economic status of the Dayak is well below the national
average. In the context of the New Economic Policy, the government should consider how to
eradicate poverty among the Dayak who live in remote rural areas. The PBDS seeks to ensure that
the voice and the interests of the Dayak are reflected in national policy.
9) If we consider the Dayak groups who have converted to Islam (masuk Melayu) or a number of non-
Muslim Melanau subgroups, it is apparent that the concept “Dayak” does not strictly coincide with
that of “non-Muslim Bumiputera.” In this paper, the convoluted issue of ethnicity will not be
addressed.
10) On this point refer to Mason [1995].
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Although the principle of the PBDS to pursue benefits for the Dayak community and its
slogan of Dayakism were often criticized as “chauvinistic,” the PBDS adopted the slogan not in
opposition to other groups, but rather as an affirmative political label envisaging the unity of
disparate non-Muslim indigenous groups under one political party [Mason 1995]. Jawan
appreciates that it was not a chauvinistic slogan but rather a “communal” one with a goal that
was similar to other parties such as Malay/Melanau-led Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu
(PBB) and the Chinese-led Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP). Yet the formation of the
PBDS clearly posed a threat to the stability of both the PBB and the SUPP in the Sarawak
Barisan [Jawan 1993].
The term “Dayakism” was mainly adopted as a deliberate attempt to emphasize the unity of
the Dayak, or the non-Muslim Bumiputera, and the development or alleviation of poverty among
the Dayak in rural areas. By stressing that most of the Dayak still live in the interior, the
PBDS advocated investment in rural development. Thus, during the campaign of 1987 and the
1991 elections for the State Assemblymen, “rural development” became the main theme of the
PBDS, and the term “ruralism” emerged in this political context in Sarawak.
Immediately before the 1987 state election, the PBDS left the state coalition government
(though not the federal coalition) in order to challenge the Sarawak Barisan state coalition.
When the polls closed, of 48 allotted seats, the Barisan parties secured 28 seats, the PBDS 15
seats, and the Parti Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak (PERMAS; a Muslim-based opposition party) 5
seats. After the election, the PBDS lost considerable power when 8 of its State Assemblymen
defected to the Barisan parties. In the 1991 state election, the PBDS candidates were returned
in 7 out of 56 constituencies. Immediately after this election, the PBDS applied to rejoin the
state coalition.
The PBDS decision to rejoin the coalition was based on the realization that, as long as they
were part of opposition, their constituencies could never benefit from the subsidies made
available for development. After the 1987 and 1991 elections, those constituencies which had
voted for the opposition were in fact not allocated any development funds, and numerous rural
communities that had supported the PBDS were excluded from the government development
plans. In short, the retaliatory measures taken by the Barisan government made it very clear
that the PBDS could never realize its goal of “ruralism” so long as it remained in the
opposition. As another condition of rejoining the state coalition government, the PBDS was
forced to declare its commitment to a “multi-ethnic party,” and could therefore no longer
advocate “Dayakism.”
 The Dayak community was reluctant to support the PBDS partly because of its reputation
for intractability,11) and also because it was generally recognized that Dayakism was ultimately
11) The PBDS seceded from the Sarawak State coalition, although it still remained in the federal coalition
(Barisan National), which seemed to the electorate to be a glaring contradiction. Furthermore, the
PBDS challenge to the state coalition was done without putting forward a candidate for chief
ministership of Sarawak in the event of its victory in the election. The failure of the PBDS to show a
more aggressive attitude in scrambling for political power disappointed its supporters.
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an Iban-centric idea.12) Beyond that, the lukewarm attitude of the Dayak also reflected their
misgivings over the practicability of the PBDS’s ideals. In other words, the Dayak themselves
were keenly aware that the whole notion of “ruralism” — priority on rural areas in the allocation
of development funds — was something that the PBDS could not delivery on as long as they
kept out of the coalition for the simple reason that the PBDS lacked any source of funds.
3. Distribution of Development Projects and “Subsidy Syndrome”
It is true that in Sarawak a large sum of money has been invested in rural development projects
under the name of “ruralism” over the last decade or so [Chin 1996]. To the extent that this
funding can be attributed to a new awareness on the part of the government of the importance
of the Dayak for political stability, perhaps the recent up-and-down behavior of the PBDS (part
of the coalition, opposed to the coalition, then back part of the coalition) did have some
significance after all. In this sub-section we examine the process of budget distribution for
rural development schemes over the last few decades and the reality of the so-called “subsidy
syndrome” among the Iban.
Among the many kinds of development projects provided by the government, the
indigenous peoples in rural areas are primarily interested in “Minor Rural Projects” (MRPs),
subsidizes made available to improve  rural infrastructures such as the repair of longhouses,
distribution of generators, supply of water and electricity, construction of jetties and bathing
places, and the extension and repair of minor feeder roads. These MRPs are generally
undertaken at the request of the rural residents themselves. For those who live in the interior,
filing an application to request an MRP is a useful expedient for it permits the local residents to
express their urgent demands immediately.
In the name of “ruralism,” the Sarawak government has invested a great deal of money to
comply with these requests by rural residents. Observing this response has made residents
keenly aware that demanding subsidies from the government is the quickest and easiest way to
fund minor development schemes or living condition improvements. Ngidang [1995] and Aeria
[1997] refer to this typical attitude of rural inhabitants as the “subsidy syndrome.”
However, the prospect of a favorable response to an MRP petition is largely dependent on
whether the petitioners have access to politicians. The government makes a pretense of
receiving MRP requests from any rural constituent, but it is clear that there is political
manipulation involved in determining which requests are accepted to become projects. Indeed,
the decision-making process of approving MRPs and allocating funds is so unclear that ordinary
people really never know the status of a request or whether funding is likely to be
approved. This opacity is related to the fact that Divisional Residents (hereafter, Residents)
and District Officers (DO) have little influence on the state government in the planning of
development projects, which is described as follows.
12) According to the 1991 census, Iban accounted for 67 percent of the total Dayak population. Iban
leadership of the Dayak community is obvious, but the lack of consideration toward other Dayak
groups dampened interest in the unity of the community.
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In 1987, Prime Minister Mahatir directed each DO to prepare a “District Development
Plan” (DDP), and most of the DOs from peninsular Malaysia responded positively. Since the
DOs themselves prepared the DDPs with the assistance of consultants and various kinds of
committees, the DOs could strengthen their influence on the development schemes in their
own districts by assuming the status of Chief Planning Officer or Chief Development
Administrator [Solhee 1994: 10].
In contrast, no district in Sarawak submitted a DDP. According to Solhee, the Sarawak
government did not issue a directive to the DOs to prepare DDPs, because the government
sought to strengthen centralization at the state government level and keep the decision-making
authority concerning development issues to itself. In effect, as Solhee points out, the authority
and influence of the Residents and the DOs in development activities have been gradually
eroding over the last decade. In some cases, the Residents and DOs are not even officially
informed of the development activities taking place within the boundaries of their areas [ibid.: 13].
In Sarawak, even the authority to authorize farm subsidy programs or minor projects such
as MRPs is not vested in the Resident or DO; rather, the individuals filling these positions are
relegated to the role of mediator between the ministries or agencies and rural residents, or at
most, they are given figurehead positions such as Chairman of Development. Consequently,
rural residents also tend to neglect the DOs. Although MRP requests are supposed to be
submitted to the local DO, most rural residents bypass this formal procedure and try to submit
their requests directly to the elected leaders in their areas or to local branch offices of the
government parties. Their behavior in this instance is based on the recognition that the DO
has little influence on the decision-making process of authorizing rural development
projects. The longhouse communities with access to politicians in particular have found that it
is swifter and more reliable to approach politicians directly than to go through the formal
process with the DO to get an application accepted. This weak position of the DO in planning
minor projects is even more apparent for larger scale development schemes such as the
development of plantations and major road construction, where their influence is practically nil.
By reducing the power of administrative officials, the Sarawak government has succeeded
in consolidating direct influence of the government parties over the rural population. In other
words, the enhancement of the rural development doctrine and the rise of the subsidy
syndrome paralleled the establishment of patron-client relations between assemblymen and the
constituents of rural areas. One interesting aspect of this development that is only very seldom
noted is that urban residents often intervene in the patron-client relations in rural areas. In the
following sections, we will discuss this issue on the basis of data obtained through field
research both in rural areas and in the communities of urban migrants.
III Development Fund Distribution and Voting Activities of Urban Residents
1. Urban Residents’ Participation in Rural Development Projects
When the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak was established in 1983, the party’s advocacy of
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“Dayakism” and “ruralism” seemed to be based on the recognition that the Dayak are
economically disadvantaged because they live in remote rural areas. However, this sense of
being marginalized in society and social entitlement developed not only among the rural Dayak
but also just as strongly among the Dayak in urban areas. In particular, the Dayak — most of
whom are non-Muslim Bumiputera — feel very strongly that the privileges extended to the
Bumiputera as part of the New Economic Policy go overwhelmingly to the Muslim Bumiputera
and that the Dayak have been largely excluded from the socio-economic mainstream.
The author has conducted field research on the living strategies of the “urban poor,” with
particular emphasis on the Iban migrants from rural areas who previously lived as squatters in
Sibu,13) a regional center of the Rajang Basin. Based on data obtained through field research
in Sibu, in this section we will examine how the “urban poor” participate politically in rural
development projects.14)
In Sarawak, there are two kinds of public elections: one is the general election for the
Parliament of the Federation, and the other is an election for the State Assembly. Both adopt a
single-member constituency system. In these elections, all citizens aged 21 years and over are
qualified to vote and can chose their polling place regardless of their current residence.
According to the author’s interviews with 132 Iban household heads who were previously
squatters but currently live in a resettlement area, 44 household heads (33.3%) stated that all of
the household members registered their votes at the polling place in their home villages. In
addition, some 31 other households (23.5%) were divided with some members of the household
registering their votes in home villages and other members in the same household registering
their votes in Sibu. Altogether, 75 households (56.8%) included members who registered their
votes in rural constituencies (Table 2).
This behavior of Iban who are resettled in the city registering their polling places back in
their home villages is called “return voting” and is based on giving careful consideration to the
stability of future life. The Iban in the study area have acquired legal residential lots in the
resettlement district and appear to be leading fairly stable lives in the city, but they have the
recent memories and experience of being squatters. They remain very much in the lower
class of Sibu, and most Iban in Sibu anticipate a substantial fall in income after retirement which
will make it difficult for them to stay in the city. Many Iban therefore plan to eventually move
back to their rural subsistence agriculture-based communities where it is far cheaper to
live. This lifecycle pattern in which urban Iban anticipate going back to their longhouses in
later life accounts for the “return voting” behavior of returning to one’s home village to
vote. This is because they see it as self-evident that rural development projects are
concentrated in the constituencies where the government parties stand to gain wider support
13) This squatter settlement emerged at the end of the 1970s on the swampy riverbanks on the outskirts
of Sibu (about 4 kilometers from the town center), where not only the Iban but also Malay, Melanau,
and Chinese lived. In 1991, the squatters were presented with a resettlement scheme by the Sarawak
government and consequently obtained legal residential lots. The details of this process are
explained in a previous paper [Soda 2000].
14) The voting activities of the Iban in urban areas were partly discussed in Soda [2000].
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among voters and elections are the most straightforward means for the Iban to demonstrate
their intention of supporting the parties in power.
The Sarawak government adopted a ballot-counting system that reveals a detailed
breakdown of the voting results of each longhouse [Mason 1995], thus making it easy for the
government to identify any longhouse that voted for an opposition candidate and retaliate by
withholding rural development funds. Conversely, a longhouse that raises its percentage of
votes supporting the government parties increases its chances of obtaining various kinds of
development funds to improve living conditions in the longhouse. In short, the “return voting”
behavior of the urban Iban is done to help raise a longhouse community’s rate of support for
the party in power, which also serves the long-term lifecycle interests of the voters who intend
to return to their villages some day.
Indeed, voting is the easiest way for the populace (including the poorest people) to
participate in politics in Sarawak, but in every election over the past decade or so, the
government parties have been almost guaranteed to win a sweeping victory. Thus the Iban of
the study area do not view elections as a way to make their opinions reflected in Parliament or
the State Assembly, but rather as an opportunity to demonstrate their pro-government support
to extract economic benefit.
This strategy is based on their perception of themselves as marginalized people. Many of
the Iban in urban areas have a common perception that can be summarized as follows: the
Chinese can acquire the necessary know-how to accumulate wealth through various kinds of
networks, and the Malay (Muslim Bumiputera) have practically unconditional access to
government subsidies because of the government’s policy of Muslim bias and preference.
However, it is practically impossible for the Dayak and the Iban to improve their situation
through their own efforts because they lack both know-how and funds; moreover, the Dayak
have been politically marginalized after a series of political defeats and splits in the Dayak-based
parties. This perception has led the Iban to conclude that in order to obtain their share of
subsidies and public funding they must assume a subservient attitude toward the govern-
Table 2 Distribution of Registered Polling Places among Each Household
Voting Distribution
Whole Membership Some of Household Whole Membership
Plan for the Future  of Household Vote  Members Vote at  of Household Others/ Total
 at Longhouse Longhouse and  Vote in Sibu Unknown
Others in Sibu
Return to longhouse
after retirement 38 16 14 5 73
“Double residence” 6 12 1 0 19
Stay in town 0 0 23 0 23
Undecided/Unknown 0 3 9 5 17




ment. In other words, they think that applications for development projects require a
demonstration of pro-government sentiment, which is often manifested by “return voting” for
the government in power. This behavior should be understood as the result of deliberate
decision-making through a process of elimination accompanied by a certain degree of
resignation rather than a superficial “subsidy syndrome.” The resignation comes from the fact
that the Iban recognize that their influence on state level politics is limited and they also lack
common political objectives [Jawan and King 1997]. Rather, Iban voters tend to be more
interested in more personal or regional issues and their votes can be readily swayed by local
issues affecting their everyday lives [ibid.: 55]. This tendency is reflected in the diversity of
the Iban voting record, which will be discussed in the remainder of this paper.
2. Diversity of the Voting Record among the Urban Poor
In the Kanowit district, which is located in the middle reaches of the Rajang Basin, the number
of registered voters greatly exceeds the resident voting age (20 and older) population as shown
by the 1991 census (Table 3). This means that a sizable number of people return to the
district from urban areas during elections, a movement that is indicative of “return voting.”
However, a closer examination of the situation based on extensive interviews with the Iban in
the study area revealed that the urban dwellers did not necessarily “return” to their own home
villages during election time, and that their voting behavior actually included a number of
different patterns. Here we will consider a number of typical cases that highlight the active
and strategic aspects of Iban voting behavior.
 The first case illustrates the “return voting” pattern described earlier where voters are
thinking ahead to their future life in the longhouse community. Yet even among the 73 out of
132 households whose heads stated their intention to return home after retirement, some 16
households (21.9%) split their registered voting places between the parents and children or
between husband and wife. There are two main reasons behind this pattern of behavior. The






1987 Election for the state assembly 13,936 2.65 14.98 82.38 (Dayak) –
1990 Election for the parliament 16,154 1.58 12.85 85.11 0.45
1991 Election for the state assembly 16,154 2.06 14.67 82.92 0.34
1995 Election for the parliament 18,049 5.00 20.00 75.00 –
1996 Election for the state assembly 17,513 1.70 13.52 83.93 0.85
Census population of 20-year-old
and over (1991) 13,027 – – – –
Source: [New Straits Times various issues; Borneo Post 1996; Malaysia 1995]
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first is closely related to the way in which they acquired legal residence in Sibu. In the late
1980s when they were still squatting on a riverbank in the southern part of Sibu,15) the Iban of
the study area struck a bargain with locally elected officials: the Iban could obtain legal
residential lots within the new resettlement area in exchange for their votes cast for the
government parties. These people are thus faced with a dilemma: they consider it important to
register their votes in their home villages to promote local development, but at the same time
they feel obligated to vote for Sibu leaders for their help in obtaining legal lots. Consequently,
a few members of these conflicted households register at a polling place in Sibu. Of course
another reason for voting in town is that they live there, so naturally they are inevitably
concerned with the improvement of their living conditions in the resettlement area. Just as in
the rural areas, the development of urban infrastructure in Sibu —  putting in drainage systems,
paving roads, installing telephones in each household, extending regular bus routes, etc. — is
achieved by submitting petitions to the politicians in power. It is for this reason that some in
the Iban community consider it important to express pro-government sentiment by voting in
Sibu. At the same time, these people acknowledge that they might transfer their voter
registration place somewhere else as their strategic needs change in the future.
The second case exploits the fact that, under the existing system, voters can choose any
polling place irrespective of where they actually live. In effect, this makes it possible for those
in power to redistribute votes from one constituency to another. For example, residents in a
district where the Barisan candidate is sure to be elected may be requested to vote in a different
district where the opposition party is influential. In the course of his research, the author
found three household heads who registered their voting places not in Sibu or their home
villages but in other districts purely at the request of powerful leaders. Maintaining and
cultivating connections with influential politicians is a way to secure development projects for
one’s home village. Cooperation may have other benefits as well, such as appointment to the
posts of penghulu and district councilor, enabling a more active role in power politics.
The third case revolves around the fact mentioned earlier that rural development funds are
unequally distributed to rural constituencies according to political decisions made by the
Barisan parties. Furthermore, the amount of money and materials dispersed in a constituency
largely depends on the local candidate’s competence in procuring funds. With this situation in
mind, four household heads in the research area stated that they often transferred their voting
registration to a constituency where it was easier to obtain development projects. Under the
terms of the Minor Rural Projects (MRPs), the applicants can demand the provisioning of actual
goods (electric generators, building materials, outboard motors, and so on) from the local
government party branch. Indeed, some cases have been reported where the applicants have
been able to acquire cash income through illegal channels. Even in these cases, the critical
15) According to research conducted in 1991 by the Land and Survey Department, Sibu, the Iban
occupied some 605 squatter houses. Considering that the Dudong constituency, which includes the
squatters area, had only 18,619 voters (in the 1991 election for State Assemblymen), it is thought that
the squatters had some influence on the elections.
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factors are one’s connections with influential people in the local party branch, and whether
these political patrons come from the same ethnic background.
As I have demonstrated, the “return voting” and other voting behavior of the Iban
represents a deliberate and straightforward strategy to improve the stability of their lives.16) It
was shown that even those who have secured a legal residence in the city often transfer their
voting registration and distribute the household members’ votes to different registration
16) Aside from the above cases, there have been instances of double and even triple voting registrations
in different constituencies, or other instances of bargaining for votes or selling votes. These are
illegal activities.
Fig. 2 Joint Venture Model of Oil-palm Plantation
Source: [Sarawak 1997]
* The percentage of distribution indicated above may vary according to the value of
the land, the cost of the project and its dept equity ratio.
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sites. It is apparent that the Iban in the study area keep a constant watch for any opportunity
to leverage the power of their voter registration to win concessions from patrons in order to
improve living conditions not only in their current urban neighborhoods but also back in their
home villages where they are likely to retire later in life.
IV Large-scale Development and Land Resource Management
The behavior of the Iban calculated to gain Minor Rural Projects (MRPs) described in the
previous section is predicated on overwhelming victory at the polls by the government
parties. In 1996, for instance, when the election for the Sarawak State Assembly was held, the
parties in the alliance captured 57 of the 62 seats.17) This sweeping victory by the alliance had
been expected before the election, so controversy over policy occurred in very few
constituencies. One rare instance where a dispute did occur in the 1996 election was in the
Machan constituency in the Kanowit district. The point at issue was relatively clear and
involved the land resource management of a newly planned oil-palm plantation in the area. In
this section, we will examine the trends of the 1996 election, particularly as pertaining to large-
scale developments having greater impact than the minor projects described earlier.
1. Dispute over the Opening of a Large-scale Plantation
In the Machan constituency in the Kanowit district, the 1996 election was the de facto
battleground between two candidates: the incumbent assemblyman from the Parti Pesaka
Bumiputera Bersatu (in the alliance), who forcefully advocated the oil-palm plantation project,
and new independent candidate who had a very different view on how the plantation should be
constructed.18) The independent candidate had a hard time getting his views expressed in the
mass media, but based on a personal interview with the candidate, his basic contentions could
be summarized as follows:
The oil-palm plantation scheme promoted by the third sector or by a Joint Venture Company
wanted to utilize Native Customary Rights Land19) over which the Iban had already established
usufruct based on history and customary usage even though no legal title had yet been issued. The
Joint Venture Company was to “lease” the native land and return a part of the profits earned by the
plantation management to the Iban “landowners” (Fig. 2). However, the scheme required the Iban to
recognize that the title to the native land would be issued in the name of Joint Venture
Company. Although the title was limited to a set term of 60 years, this seemed like too long a period
considering that oil-palms only produce oil for 25 to 30 years. The independent candidate felt that,
since the land is valuable property for the Iban, the management of land resources should be put into
the hands of the Iban. The proposed scheme could very well end up depriving the Iban of their
land. All ambiguity regarding the land’s management should be scrupulously eliminated from the
plantation scheme, and it should be modified to clearly stipulate the rights of landholders.
17) Of the remaining five seats, three seats (all from urban constituencies) were occupied by the Chinese-
based opposition party.
18) In addition to these two candidates, there was another independent candidate who drew very little
public support.
19) Regarding the concept of Native Customary Rights Land and its related problems, see Soda [1999b].
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In the view of the Iban, large-scale development projects have been closely related to land
problems. Aside from their infrastructural benefits, large-scale projects such as irrigation
systems and commercial plantations involve sensitive issues of land management, which almost
inevitably causes conflicts between residents and developers, or sometimes even among the
local residents themselves.
Most of the land in the interior of Sarawak is categorized as Native Customary Rights Land,
where no legal land title is issued. Indeed, indigenous peoples are allowed to utilize a parcel of
land based on adat (custom), so long as they can prove that the land was cleared by themselves
or by their ancestors before 1958. These customary rights notwithstanding, the land law of
Sarawak provides that the native lands “legally” belong to the Sarawak government. There is a
general feeling of unrest among the Iban over this dual land “ownership” situation. They
worry that “their” land might be unfairly utilized by the government in the name of development
projects, or that their customary right to use the land might even be taken away from
them. Plantation projects in particular exacerbate this feeling of unease because of the
requirement that the land title be issued in the name of the Joint Venture Company. Thus the
independent candidate’s articulation of these issues accurately represents the vague feeling of
unease over the security of their land rights that is prevalent in Iban society.
Meanwhile in the government-controlled press, the independent candidate was portrayed
as objecting to the plantation scheme and interfering with the economic development of rural
areas.20) This of course was a distortion because the candidate was never against the
plantation scheme itself. Indeed, he himself had tried to promote a commercial oil-palm
plantation in the same area in cooperation with a private developer instead of depending on a
government agency. From the latter part of 1993 and into 1994, the independent candidate
gathered people from the longhouses in the affected area to discuss the land issue.21)
Although the independent candidate of the Machan constituency was considered an
exceptional person who could challenge the incumbent on even terms, he lost by a majority of
4,619 to 2,389.22) For the indigenous voters in the Machan area, the 1996 election seemed to
offer two choices: they could either support the independent candidate and remain in relative
poverty unless they themselves found a way to pursue the “development” without any
government subsidy, or they could vote for the incumbent from the party in power knowing that
without any government subsidy they would face economic stagnation, even though many
voters were suspicious of the government. One can interpret that the defeat of the
independent candidate was simply because the people selected the latter choice. But the
question now arises: did they really have a choice?
Another interpretation emerged from interviews with those who favored the independent
20) For example, see the Sarawak Tribune [19 August 1996; 20 August 1996] and the Borneo Post
[3 September 1996].
21) However, due to the torturous and drawn-out process of ironing out differences of opinion among
longhouse communities, the application to open the plantation was eventually withdrawn.
22) Another independent candidate gained only 121 votes.
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candidate. Some of those who voted for the independent did not see a clear separation
between the government party and the opposition side. Indeed, some of those who supported
the independent candidate half expected that if he had won the election, the party in power
would have invited him to join it in a few years, and in that position he would have been able to
deliver government patronage to his supporters. There had been other similar instances
where an independent candidate joined the parties in power after being elected. During the
author’s interview with those close to the independent candidate, they mentioned another oil-
palm plantation in the Sarikei district where (according to them) the local residents had been
able to establish land ownership after the land had been developed by government agencies,
and they believed that the plantation in their district could very well follow this precedent.
Aside from the issue of land ownership, they contended that there was not much difference
between their attitude towards land development and the government policy. This reinforced
their belief that the independent would have probably joined the party in power.
My interviews revealed that the supporters of the independent were not just expressing
their opposition to the government policy or throwing their votes away on a candidate who
could not possible win; rather, they regarded their action as a pragmatic and expedient defiance
of the government in order to make inroads into the power structure and derive greater benefits
from the government in the near future. It can be said that their attitude made the incumbent
candidate feel insecure about his seat thus forcing him to negotiate and offer concessions to the
voters.
2. Management of Land Resources
The political episode described in the previous sub-section is very revealing from the
perspective of understanding land management and urban-rural relations.
The incident provides a window through which we can clearly observe the Iban’s changing
perception of land management. The event raised their consciousness of land “ownership.”
Most of those who stood behind the independent candidate were not against the plantation
scheme itself, but were ready to approve the scheme if only the land title could have been
issued to individual landowners. During the election campaign there was no discussion at all
regarding land resources from the viewpoint of conserving the natural environment. The
author also found very few people who objected to the scheme on the basis of wanting to
conserve their own farm land.23)
In a previous paper the author described how the residents in the longhouse communities
of the Kanowit district utilize their land for planting paddy within very narrow spaces, and
rubber trees covering all the hilly areas have been left untapped for many years [Soda
1999b]. Currently, very few people earn a subsistence by small-scale agriculture alone.
Rather, most people rely on their modest pensions, occasional contract work, and financial
23) Most of them seemed prepared to approve the plantation scheme on condition that they could secure




assistance from their children. Planting oil-palm trees on their “underutilized” land would
therefore not immediately threaten their lives. Indeed, many Iban concede that it is
unproductive to leave their land idle.
The idea that their land is “underutilized” seems incompatible with the organic cycle of
traditional shifting cultivation that requires a fairly long fallow period.24) Regarding land
utilization, the residents seem to place more emphasis on the economic value of their land in
the modern sense. If that is the case, it is only natural that they would attempt to establish a
legal basis for their occupation or ownership of the land based on customary law before
agreeing to a large-scale development project on the land. This attitude can be considered a
manifestation of their heightened consciousness of land ownership.
The second point that needs to be made in this context is that those playing a leading role
in the management of land or in the decision-making that is involved in the disposal of land are
not necessarily longhouse dwellers. Even though some parcels of land in the villages around
the town of Kanowit are already registered in the names of individual villagers, the actual title
deeds are often kept by their children who live in the cities, not by the villagers them-
selves. This accounts for the fact that when important meetings are held in villages regarding
the disposition of land, one can observe many town dwellers present at the “longhouse
meetings.”25)
In 1998, when questionnaires regarding the disposition of land were distributed to
individual villagers, or when villagers were considering whether to sign contracts permitting
development of land for the oil-palm plantation, most of them called their relatives or children in
the city to ask their advice. These relatives who reside in urban areas are very influential in
the decision-making process of longhouse communities, as will be shown in the next section.
V Leadership of Longhouse Communities and Urban-rural Relations
1. Opinion Leaders as Town Dwellers
The independent candidate for the assemblyman position of the Machan constituency in the
1996 election was an executive in a foreign-affiliated company in the town of Miri. During the
election campaign he established his headquarters in a longhouse in the Kanowit district and
set out on a stumping tour throughout the constituency. His important supporters were retired
24) From the viewpoint of the traditional cycle of shifting cultivation, “underutilized” land is important as
fallow land. But in this case, the word “underutilized” (nadai guna) indicates the remote possibility
of using the land for swidden agriculture in the near future, or it refers to the condition of land
covered by rubber trees that are left untapped. Therefore, these types of un-tended land are now
rarely recognized as “fallow land,” but tend to be regarded as idle.
25) Therefore, important longhouse meetings tend to be held on the weekend for the convenience of the
urban dwellers. The most popular means of notification is by word of mouth brought by those who
frequently move back and forth between urban and rural areas. Communications through message-
exchanging programs provided by local radio stations are also important for rural residents. There
are still very few longhouses with telephones installed, but recently some longhouse dwellers have
started using mobile phones.
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officials (former teachers, policemen, soldiers, and so on) in longhouses and clerks in private
companies who, though they generally lived in urban areas, took time off to come back to the
village during the campaign. Working behind the scenes were low-ranking government
officials on active duty in urban areas.26) Although these people currently do not hold any
positions in the power politics, the villagers nevertheless expect them to provide informal
connections with political network. Under the direction of these people, the canvassing tours
of the independent candidate were arranged.
In short, the urban dwellers from longhouses and the villagers who had lived in urban
areas for prolonged periods played a critical role as opinion leaders in longhouse communities
during the 1996 election period. Indeed, the influence of these people in rural communities
extends beyond occasional events such as elections. Their influence is apparent from the fact
that the headman of a longhouse community (tuai rumah) is sometimes found to reside not in
the longhouse but in an adjacent city.
My interviews with 132 household heads in the resettlement area in Sibu town revealed the
presence of 6 incumbent tuai rumahs27) and 2 ex-penghulus (chief of a certain domain). They
make frequent trips back and forth between Sibu and their longhouse in the country. During
their absences from the longhouse, their duties are taken over by an official in a rural branch of
the party, a local teacher,28) a councilor in the district, or by an ex-penghulu. This is partly
because in rural areas even capable people or those with good educations have little access to
job opportunities in the private sector, but only in the public sector. Another reason is that
those who are in the public sector such as public servants, penghulus, and local councilors come
under the control of the government. At present, councilors, penghulus, and other government
officials are appointed by the Sarawak government. Not surprisingly, most of them are
proponents of the government.29) From the village standpoint, these people are channels of
access to the government, or at least to the local branch of the government parties. These
locally influential people also move regularly between town and country in much the same way
as the tuai rumahs.
The longhouse community in the Kanowit district, which served as the base of the
independent candidate during the 1996 election period, was branded as anti-government.
26) The officials who openly participated in these campaigns were transferred to distant places
immediately before the voting date through the oppressive intervention of the Sarawak govern-
ment. Therefore, most government officers try to stay clear of political activities.
27) Concerning the work experiences of these tuai rumahs, one is currently a taxi driver, one formerly
served in the Department of Welfare, one worked for a state hospital as a professional driver, and two
were contract workers. The remaining one had no work experience in Sibu.
28) Since primary schools are found even in the remotest parts of the country, one cannot overlook the
political influence of schoolteachers in rural communities.
29) Immediately after the 1987 state election in which the PBDS challenged the state coalition
government, many government servants who supported PBDS were forced to resign, and councilors
and penghulus on the PBDS side were replaced [Mason 1995]. Even in the mass media, politicians
often reaffirm that the government has the power to replace such local representatives as penghulus
and councilors. In practice, the power to appoint those local leaders is under the jurisdiction of local
branches of the government parties.
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Within the community the division of opinion raised questions about the propriety of supporting
him. When the then tuai rumah handed over his position to the defeated independent in 1999,
the new leader tried to reunify the community and resume access to the government by
emphasizing the proportion of pro-government supporters within the community and by
allotting important roles to those who could maintain close ties with the wider society beyond
the village. Among the reassembled members of the JKKK or Village Development and Safety
Committee, the chairperson of the committee (tuai rumah) was then the head of a company
who usually lived in the town of Miri, the vice-chairperson was a one-time schoolmaster, the
secretary was a teacher still actively teaching, and the treasurer was a public servant (a driver
for a state-operated hospital). Other positions including chairmanships of seven bureaus30)
were assigned to two government servants (a soldier and a staff member of the Public Works
Department), two former government employees (a policeman and a staff member of the
Agriculture Department), two former teachers (one of whom had also served as a councilor of
the Kanowit district), and one woman without any previous work experience (her late husband
had been a state assemblyman, and she herself chaired the women’s committee of the Kanowit
Catholic Church).
As observed above, community leaders do not necessarily stay in their longhouses all of
the time. The key qualities of a leader are not only the leader’s ability to maintain harmony
within the community but also to maintain close connections to the outside society, especially to
the parties in power.31) Thus, longhouse communities do not necessarily choose their leaders
from among the longhouse dwellers. Rather they tend to support leaders — regardless of
their current place of residence — who can link the rural to the urban, or the longhouse
community to local assemblymen.
2. Moving between Urban and Rural Areas
Early in the paper it was mentioned that among the 132 interviewed household heads, 73
persons (55.3%) stated their intention to retire in the longhouse, and 19 persons (14.4%) wished
to maintain their residence both in the longhouse and in town, and more than half of these
already enjoyed this “double residence” status. Among these 132 household heads, 75 percent
visit their home village at least once a year, and 34.8 percent come back to the village almost
every month.
It is easy to understand that these tendencies are a reflection of the Iban’s migratory or
nomadic traditions. Yet they also emphasize that it is important for them to establish
30) These seven bureaus are in charge of revitalization of activities concerning “Youth & Culture (Belia &
Kebudayaan),” “Women & Livelihood (Wanita & Urus Rumah Tangga),” “Economic Development
(Penbangunan/Economi),” “Welfare (Kebajikan),” “Security & Hygiene (Keselamatan & Kesihatan),”
“Education (Pendidikan),” and “Religion (Keagamaan).”
31) When rural people apply for development projects, the application will be viewed in a favorable light if
it bears the signatures of persons who have strong connections with the government. In short, what
is important is how to develop and maintain close ties with penghulus, councilors, high administrative
officials, and so on.
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residences in both urban areas and in the longhouse community in order to participate in
various kinds of activities and to assert their rights on behalf of the village. In other words,
their frequent moves back and forth between town and longhouse is motivated by a desire to
make their lives in some degree more stable, and also to link their urban activities with those of
the longhouse at the level of ordinary life [Soda 2000].
Most interior areas of Sarawak still have no telephone or newspaper delivery
service. Even though television sets are becoming increasingly popular with the diffusion of
power generators, there is no Sarawak-based TV station. Except for message-exchanging
programs provided by local radio stations, there is no form of mass media that provides
information relevant to the daily lives of people in the interior. Therefore, the frequent returns
of urban dwellers to the village provide valuable opportunities for the longhouse communities to
acquire information about what is going on in the wider world. The return of those with
political access is especially important considering the central role of the government parties in
authorizing rural development projects that are crucial to the development of longhouse
communities.
Over the last decade, the Sarawak government has frequently emphasized its goal of
distributing funds not with an “urban bias” but strictly to support rural development, a message
that is directed specifically toward the non-Muslim Bumiputera, who make up the vast majority
of inhabitants in the interior. In other words, the government is acknowledging those
excluded from the earlier urban-biased development policy and is attempting to quell discontent
through the distribution of government subsidies among rural population. Some Iban are
forgiving and appreciate the government’s attitude. Yet considering that many Iban intend to
establish homes in both urban and rural areas and constantly move back and forth between city
and country in a never-ending quest for development funds and subsidies, it is almost
meaningless to sort out winners (beneficiaries) from losers in the “development games” in
relation with rural-urban disequilibrium.
Although acquisition of a legal lot in Sibu guarantees their right to permanent residence in
the city, many Iban in the research area feel it would be difficult to continue to live in town after
retirement, and expect to move back to the longhouse. This perception reinforces their
political behavior in maintaining both a current residence in town and a future living base back
in the longhouse. Their mobility such as manifested in return voting from urban to rural areas
and their ingratiating behavior toward the government parties can be viewed as deliberate
strategies for securing government subsidies and funding for development projects. Even
when they appeared to challenge the party in power, the true intention of the Iban was to make
inroads into the power structure and derive certain benefits from greater access. Thus it is
inappropriate and a gross simplification to consider the “fawning attitude” of the Iban (which





Since the 1970s, Southeast Asian countries have been trying to replace class struggles or
conflicts over the distribution of resources with a “national consensus of economic growth” by
emphasizing the priority of “development” [Shiraishi 1994]. In order to grasp the meaning of
development policy in the context of Southeast Asia, where countries typically have multi-ethnic
societies, it is also important to focus on the response of each ethnic group to the politics of
development.
The political behavior of the Iban regarding development projects seems to be a pragmatic
response calculated to obtain economic benefit. It may be possible to explain Iban behavior
with the concept of “everyday forms of resistance” conceived by Scott [1985]. However, I
would argue that Iban behavior as described in this paper differs from Scott’s concept in at least
two respects.
First, the objectives of Iban activities go well beyond the mere level of subsistence. Rather
than viewing their activities as passive and low-profile tactics to minimize their disadvantage, I
see their behavior in a more positive light as a struggle to maximize their own interests, albeit
within a limited range of choices. Secondly, although the Iban may exhibit some signs of
resistance in their day-to-day efforts to gain benefits, it is clear that their primary efforts to gain
advantages are through legitimate political means such as influencing elections.
Their strategies are not limited to such low-profile techniques as dissimilation, foot-
dragging, pilfering, and feigned ignorance. Rather, they sometimes act in compliance with
government policies, they sometimes withdraw economic benefits from unconnected
constituencies by moving their voter registration place, and they sometimes show temporary
defiance towards the government in order to penetrate the power structure. These strategies
take on a very different aspect from “everyday forms of resistance.”
What should be emphasized here is that the key actors of these various efforts are mobile
urban dwellers who frequently move back and forth between urban and rural areas. Their
proactive efforts to secure economic benefits are sometimes reflected in the transfer of their
voting registration from one constituency to another. This act could have an impact on the
allocation of development funds that are politically motivated to redress regional disparity.
Given their great mobility and role of opinion leaders in longhouse communities, these
urban Iban act as intermediaries between longhouse residents and politicians, or between
“vulnerable peasants” and development politics. In this sense, urban dwellers play a pivotal
role of involving longhouse communities in political interaction. At the same time we cannot
simply regard the longhouse residents as passive observers of the political scene. As was
mentioned in section V, the longhouse residents themselves choose their leaders from those
who live in urban areas and have access to politicians. Thus indirectly the local rural folk also
take some initiative in trying to involve themselves into the politics of development policy.
In this paper, the author discussed the issue of resource distribution in Sarawak, by using
the urban inhabitants of an indigenous people as an instrument of analysis. Regarding these
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people as intermediary between urban and rural areas was useful for reconsidering the
dichotomy between the developmental state and “vulnerable peasants,” and between urban-
biased development and “ruralism.”
It is certain that the population of indigenous peoples residing in urban areas has been
increasing along with economic growth, promotion of development projects, and the spread of
urbanization. Although the Iban are still in a marginalized position in Malaysian society, the
range of their social and political activities is constantly expanding. It will thus become
increasingly important to focus greater attention on the political roles of marginalized peoples in
urban areas — ethnic minorities, the urban poor, so-called urban villagers, and so on — in the
years ahead. This is all the more pressing considering that rural development is held up as
one of the important political goals of the nation state in many third world countries. A deeper
understanding of this subject is also essential in discussing the relationship between
development policy and ethnicity in the Third World.
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